899 F.Supp. 471

                         A.R. SALMAN, Plaintiff,
                                    v.
       DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY--INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant.
                           No. CV-N-95-52-DWH.
                       United States District Court,
                               D. Nevada.
                             April 11, 1995.

	A.R. Salman, Reno, Nevada in pro per.
	Kathryn E. Landreth, U.S. Attorney, Reno, Nevada, Alisa
R. Margolis, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.
ORDER

	HAGEN, District Judge.
	Plaintiff A.R. Salman sued defendant Department of the Treasury--
Internal Revenue Service in state court for use of plaintiff's corporate
name (# 1a).  Claiming to have been named in this action improperly, the
United States of America removed to this court (# 1), and requested an
extension of time in which to answer (# 1c), which the court granted.
Salman filed a "Notice and Demand to Strike" the removal notice and the
request for an extension of time (# 1d).  Salman then filed a "Notice and
Demand to Strike" this court's order granting the extension of time and
this court's minute order dated February 8, 1995 (# 2).  The United States
moved to dismiss and for an injunction barring Salman from filing any
future actions against it without leave of the court (# 3).  In response,
Salman filed a "Notice and Demand to Strike" the United States' motion (#
4).
ANALYSIS
	Salman claims to own the name "Department of the
Treasury--Internal Revenue Service" by virtue of having chartered a
corporation in that name in Nevada. He further alleges the IRS is
wrongfully using that name and the IRS is not in fact a United States
government agency.  Salman seeks over $900,000 in damages and injunctive
relief.
	According to the United States' motion to dismiss, Salman has
filed numerous lawsuits against it, many of which have been dismissed as
frivolous.  The United States District Court, District of Nevada, recently
dismissed two similar actions in which Salman attempted to sue the IRS.
In those actions, Salman contended the IRS did not have the power to levy
taxes because it is not a governmental agency.  In CV-N-94-518, the court
dismissed Salman's claims, finding "the Internal Revenue Service is a
governmental agency and an agency of the United States Government."
Docket # 29.  Additionally, the United States points to a list of over 10
lawsuits Salman has brought over the years against the United States or
its agents.  It also contends the Ninth Circuit has twice sanctioned
Salman for taking frivolous appeals.
	As for the instant case, the court finds there is no basis
in fact for Salman's contention that the IRS is not a government agency of
the United States.  The United States cites to a host of Constitutional
and statutory provisions that establish the IRS is indeed a federal
agency.  Salman was well aware of the controlling statutory authority that
the IRS is a governmental agency from the court's order in CV-N-94-518.
In short, Salman's action is wholly frivolous, and this court must dismiss
it with prejudice.
	In support of its request for injunctive relief, the United States
argues monetary sanctions imposed by the Ninth Circuit have not deterred
Salman from filing further frivolous actions.  Further, the United States
asserts Salman has used the court to harass the United States and its
agents.  Thus, it requests that this court enjoin Salman "from filing any
further actions, in any court, against the United States of America and/or
its agency the Internal Revenue Service and/or any
employee/official/officer thereof without prior permission from this
Court."  Mot. Dismiss at 9.
	The Ninth Circuit recognizes "the inherent power of federal
courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing
carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances."
DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.1990).  In particular, a
district court may enjoin a vexatious litigant under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. s 1651(a), by issuing an order requiring the litigant to seek
permission from the court prior to filing any future suits.  See id.
However, such an order should "rarely" be filed, id., and only when four
conditions are met: (1) plaintiff is given adequate notice to oppose a
restrictive prefiling order before it is entered; (2) the court provides
an adequate record for review, including a listing of all the cases and
motions that led the [c]ourt to conclude that a vexatious litigant order
was needed; (3) the [c]ourt makes substantive findings as to the frivolous
or harassing nature of the litigant's actions;  and (4) the [c]ourt order
is narrowly tailored. Johns v. Town of Los Gatos, 834 F.Supp. 1230, 1232
(N.D.Cal.1993) (citing DeLong, 912 F.2d at 1147-48).  Although the United
States' motion gives a cursory history of Salman's previous litigation, it
does not provide the court with an adequate basis upon which to file a
narrowly tailored vexatious litigant order against Salman.  In particular,
the United States has not provided information upon which the court may
make substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment, nor does it set
forth sufficient information on Salman's past suits by which the court can
narrowly tailor a prefiling order.
	Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the United States' motion to
dismiss (# 3) is GRANTED;  Salman's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States shall have twenty
days from the date of this order within which to file supplemental points
and authorities in support of its motion for injunctive relief;  if the
United States does not file said brief, its motion for injunctive relief
will be denied;
	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall have fifteen days
within which to file an opposition to the above brief, and the United
States shall have ten days within which to reply.